2023考研英語閱讀對(duì)沖基金的成功
The success of hedge funds
對(duì)沖基金的成功
Two books analyse what makes hedge-fundmanagers greatand reach very differentconclusions.
兩本介紹對(duì)沖基金的成功之處的書其結(jié)論大相徑庭。
The Alpha Masters: Unlocking the Genius of the World s Top Hedge Funds. By Maneet Ahuja.
阿爾法大師：揭秘世界頂尖對(duì)沖基金的智慧，Maneet Ahuja著。
The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It s Too Good To Be True. BySimon Lack.
對(duì)沖基金的海市蜃樓：巨資的幻象及其難以置信的原因，Simon Lack著。
Forget the one percent denounced by the Occupy Wall Street protesters. Hedge-fundmanagers have made so much money for themselves that they are in the top percent of theone percent. The billions they have raked in make bankers bonuses look titchy. Theirvaunted success trading stocks, bonds and other instruments has helped to transform acottage industry into a behemoth; today hedge funds oversee more than $2.1 trillion. Aclass of moneymen who once only managed funds for buccaneering, rich families now countthe world s largest public pension funds and endowments as clients.
忘記 占領(lǐng)華爾街 運(yùn)動(dòng)中所詆毀的那百分之一。對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理幫自己賺的錢足以讓其成為這百分之一中的佼佼者。他們撈回來上百億的資金讓銀行家的分紅顯得寒磣。他們?cè)诠善保瑐脱苌方灰咨先〉昧肆钊速澷p的成績(jī)，這也幫助產(chǎn)業(yè)從一家庭作坊式的產(chǎn)業(yè)成為龍頭產(chǎn)業(yè)。今天對(duì)沖基金管理著超過2.1萬億美元。曾經(jīng)為喜歡投機(jī)的富翁家族理財(cái)?shù)慕鹑诩遥F(xiàn)今已讓世界上最大的公共養(yǎng)老金，基金會(huì)成為其客戶。
Have hedge funds succeeded because of their investment genius, or their craftymarketing? Two new books disagree on whether the hedge-fund managers golden chaliceis half-full or half-empty. Maneet Ahuja, a CNBC producer who worked briefly on Wall Streetbefore taking a job at the Wall Street Journal, has written a homage to hedgies. She was inawe of Wall Street already when she was an intern at Citigroup . She has never shed it. The Alpha Masters profiles 11 of theindustry s best-known bosses, and looks at their investment philosophies and their famoustrades. John Paulson made billions predicting the bursting of America s housing bubble;James Chanos, a short-seller, disrobed Enron; and Ray Dalio, the boss of Bridgewater, theworld s largest hedge fund, makes a killing for his investors and keeps calm doingtranscendental meditation.
對(duì)沖基金的成功真的是因?yàn)樗麄兺顿Y的智慧么?還是因?yàn)樗麄兲幮姆e慮的市場(chǎng)企劃?兩本新書在對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理們的金杯里究竟是半桶水還是半桶空氣的問題上產(chǎn)生異見。曾短暫任職于華爾街而后加入華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)的CNBC制片人Maneet Ahuja，向?qū)_這幫家伙寫了篇致敬。在她在花旗實(shí)習(xí)的時(shí)候就十分敬畏華爾街。他至今沒有改變這一印象。《阿爾法大師》列舉了11位業(yè)界最知名的總裁，并分析他們投資哲學(xué)和經(jīng)典案例。約翰?保爾森因預(yù)測(cè)到美國房地產(chǎn)泡沫而賺了幾十億美元;賣空家James Chanos剝光了安然公司;世界上最大的對(duì)沖基金B(yǎng)ridgewater總裁Ray Dalio，為其投資者抓住獵殺機(jī)會(huì)而通過冥思竟作來保持冷靜。
Throughout her book Ms Ahuja seems to be in a trance herself, in thrall to the glamour of hersubjects. She never questions the judgment of her alpha-men and always gives them thelast word. She devotes dozens of pages to Mr Paulson s rise in the hedge-fund industry, butglosses over his poor performance in 2011. His results have led some to speculate that hemay have the unfortunate record of both earning and losing the most money in hedge-fundhistory. She quotes one of his 2011 letters to investors asserting that bank stockswhosestruggles pulled down his funds performancewould rebound when the economy improves,never criticising what he did or pointing out that investors will have to wait ages to claw backsuch massive losses. Nor does she grasp at bigger themes or the many common factors thathedge-fund managers share. Is it ego, courage, good networks or charisma that hasbrought them more success than their fellow financiers?
Ahuja在她的整本書里都好似被催眠，完全被其采訪對(duì)象的成功所迷住。她從來沒有質(zhì)疑她書中的阿爾法大師的判斷力，視他們的話為至理名言。她為保爾森在對(duì)沖基金行業(yè)的冉冉升起洋洋灑灑寫了十幾頁，而對(duì)他在 2011年的糟糕表現(xiàn)則一筆帶過。一些人懷疑保爾森可能會(huì)創(chuàng)造一個(gè)悲劇性紀(jì)錄對(duì)沖基金史上既是盈利最高也是虧損最多的經(jīng)理。她引用了保爾森2011年寫給股東信件里的話，他堅(jiān)稱連累該基金業(yè)績(jī)的銀行股在經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況恢復(fù)時(shí)將反彈。而她從來沒指責(zé)過他的所作所為，也并沒有指出投資者需要等到天長(zhǎng)地久才能從如此之深的虧損里爬出來。她也并沒有抓住整個(gè)大環(huán)境或其他一些對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理的共通因素。究竟是自信，勇氣，有關(guān)系還是魅力使得他們比金融業(yè)同行更成功?
The Hedge Fund Mirage attacks the Wall Street worshippers blind adulation. Simon Lack,who spent 23 years at JPMorgan, an investment bank, selecting hedge funds to invest in,grew tired of the free hand that investors all too often gave managers. He has written aprovocative book questioning a central tenet of the hedge-fund industry: itsperformance is always worth paying for. The promise of superior performance is wrong,he says. Of course some investors make a killing, but on average hedge funds haveunderperformed even risk-free Treasury bills. This is because the bulk of investors capitalhas flooded in over the past ten years, whereas hedge funds performed best when theindustry was smaller than it is now. What is more, it is hard to know how hedge fundsactually fare, since indices that track industry performance tend to overstate the returns.Funds that do badly or implode are not usually included in the indices at all.
《對(duì)沖基金的海市蜃樓》對(duì)華爾街追隨者的盲目崇拜進(jìn)行了攻擊。曾在投資銀行摩根大通工作23年的Simon Lack，當(dāng)時(shí)的任務(wù)是分配在對(duì)沖基金的投資。后來厭倦了投資者常常給予管理者過多的自由。他寫了本具有挑釁性的書來質(zhì)疑對(duì)沖基金的核心：它的業(yè)績(jī)是物有所值的。他寫道，這些對(duì)優(yōu)秀業(yè)績(jī)的承諾是錯(cuò)誤的。當(dāng)然一部分投資者是會(huì)有所獵獲的，但平均來說對(duì)沖基金的表現(xiàn)連無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的美國國債都不如。這是因?yàn)榇蟛糠滞顿Y者的資金都是最近這十年才涌入的，而對(duì)沖基金表現(xiàn)最佳的時(shí)候是比現(xiàn)在小的時(shí)候。更有問題的是不知道對(duì)沖基金的表現(xiàn)究竟如何，因?yàn)樽粉櫂I(yè)界表現(xiàn)的的指數(shù)通常夸大回報(bào)。那些表現(xiàn)很差或破產(chǎn)了的通常都不包括在這些指數(shù)里。
Why would any client continue to pay for such mediocre returns? One reason is that hedge-fund managers are incredibly good salesmen. In addition, industry insiders who are all tooaware of hedge funds shortcomings choose not to expose them, Mr Lack argues. Moreover,the common fee structure, in which hedge-fund managers keep 2% of assets as amanagement fee to cover expenses and 20% of profits generated by performance, hasmade many managers rich, but not their clients. Mr Lack calculates that hedge-fundmanagers have kept around 84% of profits generated, with investors only getting 16% since1998. Where are the customers yachts? is the title of one chapter. What is worse, thedisastrous dive of equity markets in 2008 may have wiped out all the profits that hedgefunds have ever generated for investors.
為什么客戶要繼續(xù)為如此普通的回報(bào)付費(fèi)呢?其中一個(gè)原因是對(duì)沖基金的經(jīng)理都是不可思議的優(yōu)秀銷售人員。同時(shí) Lack認(rèn)為，非常了解對(duì)沖基金軟肋的業(yè)內(nèi)人士選擇不披露它們。再加上通用的費(fèi)用結(jié)構(gòu)使得許多經(jīng)理變得富裕，而非他們的客戶。這些費(fèi)用包括對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理每年保留總資產(chǎn)的2%作為支付開銷的 管理費(fèi) 和盈利業(yè)績(jī)的20%。Lack計(jì)算自1998年起，對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理大約保留了84%的總利潤(rùn)，而投資者只拿到了16%。 客戶的游艇去哪里? 是第一章的標(biāo)題。更可惡的是2008股票市場(chǎng)災(zāi)難性跳水可能已經(jīng)把對(duì)沖基金為投資者賺的所有利潤(rùn)都抹殺掉了。
Mr Lack places a good deal of the blame for this on investors who fail to ask tough enoughquestions and have not grasped that they want yesterday s returns without yesterday s risk.They invest money with the biggest, best-known funds that look nothing like those whoseaggregate performance they want to emulate. Instead investors should stand up tomanagers, negotiate more favourable terms and put their money into smaller funds, whichtend to perform better.
Lack將大部分指責(zé)都指向投資者，因?yàn)樗麄儧]有問足夠深入的問題，并且沒有意識(shí)到他們自己是在祈求 獲得以前的回報(bào)卻不希望承擔(dān)對(duì)應(yīng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 。他們投資給最大，最有名的基金，而這些基金的累積表現(xiàn)跟投資者所希望模仿的表現(xiàn)相差甚遠(yuǎn)。投資者應(yīng)該挑戰(zhàn)經(jīng)理們，跟他們協(xié)商一些更有利的條款，并將他們的錢放入小型基金里，因?yàn)檫@些小基金往往表現(xiàn)更好。
Mr Lack points out that large institutional investors always like to invest in bigger hedgefunds. That way they need not worry about being the bulk of a small fund s investor-base.But he offers no solution for these large investors, who cannot put big sums into the small,nimble funds that he touts. Nor does he analyse how hedge-fund performance compareswith other asset classes, such as private equity. As a result, the reader is left with a naggingunanswered question: would investors do better to avoid hedge funds altogether and, if so,where should they put their money in future?
Lack還指出大型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者都喜歡投資大型對(duì)沖基金。這樣他們不需要擔(dān)心自己成為小基金的主要客戶。大型機(jī)構(gòu)不可能將大額資金放入他所推崇的那些敏捷的小基金里，而他并沒有提出如何解決這些大型投資者所面臨的問題。同時(shí)他也沒有進(jìn)行對(duì)沖基金跟其他基金的表現(xiàn)對(duì)比，例如私募基金。因此，這給讀者留下了一個(gè)令人困惑的問題：投資者如果完全退出對(duì)沖基金，表現(xiàn)是不是會(huì)更好呢?如果是的話，他們以后又應(yīng)該把錢投到哪里呢?
In his conclusion Mr Lack argues that most hedge-fund books are written by theirproponents. His ambition was to spark debate and help to change the industry. Whetherhe succeeds or not remains to be seen. Hedge-fund executives have already reacted angrilyto The Hedge Fund Mirage, which suggests that looking into the mirror may be painful. Theyrightly worry the days of easy praise are over.
在他的總結(jié)里他寫道，大多數(shù)關(guān)于對(duì)沖基金的書都是由它的 擁護(hù)者 寫的。他的野心在于將這場(chǎng)辯論點(diǎn)燃，并寄希望于此以改變整個(gè)行業(yè)。至于他在這一點(diǎn)上是否成功了，還有待考證。對(duì)沖基金總裁們已經(jīng)對(duì)《對(duì)沖基金的海市蜃樓》一書表示憤怒，這顯示了要面對(duì)鏡子里的自己是痛苦的。他們擔(dān)心民眾對(duì)其慷慨贊美的日子已經(jīng)終結(jié)，這倒不是杞人憂天。
The success of hedge funds
對(duì)沖基金的成功
Two books analyse what makes hedge-fundmanagers greatand reach very differentconclusions.
兩本介紹對(duì)沖基金的成功之處的書其結(jié)論大相徑庭。
The Alpha Masters: Unlocking the Genius of the World s Top Hedge Funds. By Maneet Ahuja.
阿爾法大師：揭秘世界頂尖對(duì)沖基金的智慧，Maneet Ahuja著。
The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It s Too Good To Be True. BySimon Lack.
對(duì)沖基金的海市蜃樓：巨資的幻象及其難以置信的原因，Simon Lack著。
Forget the one percent denounced by the Occupy Wall Street protesters. Hedge-fundmanagers have made so much money for themselves that they are in the top percent of theone percent. The billions they have raked in make bankers bonuses look titchy. Theirvaunted success trading stocks, bonds and other instruments has helped to transform acottage industry into a behemoth; today hedge funds oversee more than $2.1 trillion. Aclass of moneymen who once only managed funds for buccaneering, rich families now countthe world s largest public pension funds and endowments as clients.
忘記 占領(lǐng)華爾街 運(yùn)動(dòng)中所詆毀的那百分之一。對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理幫自己賺的錢足以讓其成為這百分之一中的佼佼者。他們撈回來上百億的資金讓銀行家的分紅顯得寒磣。他們?cè)诠善保瑐脱苌方灰咨先〉昧肆钊速澷p的成績(jī)，這也幫助產(chǎn)業(yè)從一家庭作坊式的產(chǎn)業(yè)成為龍頭產(chǎn)業(yè)。今天對(duì)沖基金管理著超過2.1萬億美元。曾經(jīng)為喜歡投機(jī)的富翁家族理財(cái)?shù)慕鹑诩遥F(xiàn)今已讓世界上最大的公共養(yǎng)老金，基金會(huì)成為其客戶。
Have hedge funds succeeded because of their investment genius, or their craftymarketing? Two new books disagree on whether the hedge-fund managers golden chaliceis half-full or half-empty. Maneet Ahuja, a CNBC producer who worked briefly on Wall Streetbefore taking a job at the Wall Street Journal, has written a homage to hedgies. She was inawe of Wall Street already when she was an intern at Citigroup . She has never shed it. The Alpha Masters profiles 11 of theindustry s best-known bosses, and looks at their investment philosophies and their famoustrades. John Paulson made billions predicting the bursting of America s housing bubble;James Chanos, a short-seller, disrobed Enron; and Ray Dalio, the boss of Bridgewater, theworld s largest hedge fund, makes a killing for his investors and keeps calm doingtranscendental meditation.
對(duì)沖基金的成功真的是因?yàn)樗麄兺顿Y的智慧么?還是因?yàn)樗麄兲幮姆e慮的市場(chǎng)企劃?兩本新書在對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理們的金杯里究竟是半桶水還是半桶空氣的問題上產(chǎn)生異見。曾短暫任職于華爾街而后加入華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)的CNBC制片人Maneet Ahuja，向?qū)_這幫家伙寫了篇致敬。在她在花旗實(shí)習(xí)的時(shí)候就十分敬畏華爾街。他至今沒有改變這一印象。《阿爾法大師》列舉了11位業(yè)界最知名的總裁，并分析他們投資哲學(xué)和經(jīng)典案例。約翰?保爾森因預(yù)測(cè)到美國房地產(chǎn)泡沫而賺了幾十億美元;賣空家James Chanos剝光了安然公司;世界上最大的對(duì)沖基金B(yǎng)ridgewater總裁Ray Dalio，為其投資者抓住獵殺機(jī)會(huì)而通過冥思竟作來保持冷靜。
Throughout her book Ms Ahuja seems to be in a trance herself, in thrall to the glamour of hersubjects. She never questions the judgment of her alpha-men and always gives them thelast word. She devotes dozens of pages to Mr Paulson s rise in the hedge-fund industry, butglosses over his poor performance in 2011. His results have led some to speculate that hemay have the unfortunate record of both earning and losing the most money in hedge-fundhistory. She quotes one of his 2011 letters to investors asserting that bank stockswhosestruggles pulled down his funds performancewould rebound when the economy improves,never criticising what he did or pointing out that investors will have to wait ages to claw backsuch massive losses. Nor does she grasp at bigger themes or the many common factors thathedge-fund managers share. Is it ego, courage, good networks or charisma that hasbrought them more success than their fellow financiers?
Ahuja在她的整本書里都好似被催眠，完全被其采訪對(duì)象的成功所迷住。她從來沒有質(zhì)疑她書中的阿爾法大師的判斷力，視他們的話為至理名言。她為保爾森在對(duì)沖基金行業(yè)的冉冉升起洋洋灑灑寫了十幾頁，而對(duì)他在 2011年的糟糕表現(xiàn)則一筆帶過。一些人懷疑保爾森可能會(huì)創(chuàng)造一個(gè)悲劇性紀(jì)錄對(duì)沖基金史上既是盈利最高也是虧損最多的經(jīng)理。她引用了保爾森2011年寫給股東信件里的話，他堅(jiān)稱連累該基金業(yè)績(jī)的銀行股在經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況恢復(fù)時(shí)將反彈。而她從來沒指責(zé)過他的所作所為，也并沒有指出投資者需要等到天長(zhǎng)地久才能從如此之深的虧損里爬出來。她也并沒有抓住整個(gè)大環(huán)境或其他一些對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理的共通因素。究竟是自信，勇氣，有關(guān)系還是魅力使得他們比金融業(yè)同行更成功?
The Hedge Fund Mirage attacks the Wall Street worshippers blind adulation. Simon Lack,who spent 23 years at JPMorgan, an investment bank, selecting hedge funds to invest in,grew tired of the free hand that investors all too often gave managers. He has written aprovocative book questioning a central tenet of the hedge-fund industry: itsperformance is always worth paying for. The promise of superior performance is wrong,he says. Of course some investors make a killing, but on average hedge funds haveunderperformed even risk-free Treasury bills. This is because the bulk of investors capitalhas flooded in over the past ten years, whereas hedge funds performed best when theindustry was smaller than it is now. What is more, it is hard to know how hedge fundsactually fare, since indices that track industry performance tend to overstate the returns.Funds that do badly or implode are not usually included in the indices at all.
《對(duì)沖基金的海市蜃樓》對(duì)華爾街追隨者的盲目崇拜進(jìn)行了攻擊。曾在投資銀行摩根大通工作23年的Simon Lack，當(dāng)時(shí)的任務(wù)是分配在對(duì)沖基金的投資。后來厭倦了投資者常常給予管理者過多的自由。他寫了本具有挑釁性的書來質(zhì)疑對(duì)沖基金的核心：它的業(yè)績(jī)是物有所值的。他寫道，這些對(duì)優(yōu)秀業(yè)績(jī)的承諾是錯(cuò)誤的。當(dāng)然一部分投資者是會(huì)有所獵獲的，但平均來說對(duì)沖基金的表現(xiàn)連無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的美國國債都不如。這是因?yàn)榇蟛糠滞顿Y者的資金都是最近這十年才涌入的，而對(duì)沖基金表現(xiàn)最佳的時(shí)候是比現(xiàn)在小的時(shí)候。更有問題的是不知道對(duì)沖基金的表現(xiàn)究竟如何，因?yàn)樽粉櫂I(yè)界表現(xiàn)的的指數(shù)通常夸大回報(bào)。那些表現(xiàn)很差或破產(chǎn)了的通常都不包括在這些指數(shù)里。
Why would any client continue to pay for such mediocre returns? One reason is that hedge-fund managers are incredibly good salesmen. In addition, industry insiders who are all tooaware of hedge funds shortcomings choose not to expose them, Mr Lack argues. Moreover,the common fee structure, in which hedge-fund managers keep 2% of assets as amanagement fee to cover expenses and 20% of profits generated by performance, hasmade many managers rich, but not their clients. Mr Lack calculates that hedge-fundmanagers have kept around 84% of profits generated, with investors only getting 16% since1998. Where are the customers yachts? is the title of one chapter. What is worse, thedisastrous dive of equity markets in 2008 may have wiped out all the profits that hedgefunds have ever generated for investors.
為什么客戶要繼續(xù)為如此普通的回報(bào)付費(fèi)呢?其中一個(gè)原因是對(duì)沖基金的經(jīng)理都是不可思議的優(yōu)秀銷售人員。同時(shí) Lack認(rèn)為，非常了解對(duì)沖基金軟肋的業(yè)內(nèi)人士選擇不披露它們。再加上通用的費(fèi)用結(jié)構(gòu)使得許多經(jīng)理變得富裕，而非他們的客戶。這些費(fèi)用包括對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理每年保留總資產(chǎn)的2%作為支付開銷的 管理費(fèi) 和盈利業(yè)績(jī)的20%。Lack計(jì)算自1998年起，對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理大約保留了84%的總利潤(rùn)，而投資者只拿到了16%。 客戶的游艇去哪里? 是第一章的標(biāo)題。更可惡的是2008股票市場(chǎng)災(zāi)難性跳水可能已經(jīng)把對(duì)沖基金為投資者賺的所有利潤(rùn)都抹殺掉了。
Mr Lack places a good deal of the blame for this on investors who fail to ask tough enoughquestions and have not grasped that they want yesterday s returns without yesterday s risk.They invest money with the biggest, best-known funds that look nothing like those whoseaggregate performance they want to emulate. Instead investors should stand up tomanagers, negotiate more favourable terms and put their money into smaller funds, whichtend to perform better.
Lack將大部分指責(zé)都指向投資者，因?yàn)樗麄儧]有問足夠深入的問題，并且沒有意識(shí)到他們自己是在祈求 獲得以前的回報(bào)卻不希望承擔(dān)對(duì)應(yīng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 。他們投資給最大，最有名的基金，而這些基金的累積表現(xiàn)跟投資者所希望模仿的表現(xiàn)相差甚遠(yuǎn)。投資者應(yīng)該挑戰(zhàn)經(jīng)理們，跟他們協(xié)商一些更有利的條款，并將他們的錢放入小型基金里，因?yàn)檫@些小基金往往表現(xiàn)更好。
Mr Lack points out that large institutional investors always like to invest in bigger hedgefunds. That way they need not worry about being the bulk of a small fund s investor-base.But he offers no solution for these large investors, who cannot put big sums into the small,nimble funds that he touts. Nor does he analyse how hedge-fund performance compareswith other asset classes, such as private equity. As a result, the reader is left with a naggingunanswered question: would investors do better to avoid hedge funds altogether and, if so,where should they put their money in future?
Lack還指出大型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者都喜歡投資大型對(duì)沖基金。這樣他們不需要擔(dān)心自己成為小基金的主要客戶。大型機(jī)構(gòu)不可能將大額資金放入他所推崇的那些敏捷的小基金里，而他并沒有提出如何解決這些大型投資者所面臨的問題。同時(shí)他也沒有進(jìn)行對(duì)沖基金跟其他基金的表現(xiàn)對(duì)比，例如私募基金。因此，這給讀者留下了一個(gè)令人困惑的問題：投資者如果完全退出對(duì)沖基金，表現(xiàn)是不是會(huì)更好呢?如果是的話，他們以后又應(yīng)該把錢投到哪里呢?
In his conclusion Mr Lack argues that most hedge-fund books are written by theirproponents. His ambition was to spark debate and help to change the industry. Whetherhe succeeds or not remains to be seen. Hedge-fund executives have already reacted angrilyto The Hedge Fund Mirage, which suggests that looking into the mirror may be painful. Theyrightly worry the days of easy praise are over.
在他的總結(jié)里他寫道，大多數(shù)關(guān)于對(duì)沖基金的書都是由它的 擁護(hù)者 寫的。他的野心在于將這場(chǎng)辯論點(diǎn)燃，并寄希望于此以改變整個(gè)行業(yè)。至于他在這一點(diǎn)上是否成功了，還有待考證。對(duì)沖基金總裁們已經(jīng)對(duì)《對(duì)沖基金的海市蜃樓》一書表示憤怒，這顯示了要面對(duì)鏡子里的自己是痛苦的。他們擔(dān)心民眾對(duì)其慷慨贊美的日子已經(jīng)終結(jié)，這倒不是杞人憂天。
