2023考研英語(yǔ)閱讀中國(guó)的海外投資
China abroad 中國(guó)的海外投資
IN EUROPE, the red carpet. In America, a red mist.This weeks tour of European capitals by Wen Jiabao,Chinas prime minister, underlined the starktransatlantic difference in responses to Chinas economic clout. European leaders, caught up inthe euro areas crisis, want China to buy more of their debt; American politicians worry that itowns too much of theirs. For European politicians the value of the yuan is one worry amongmany; it sometimes feels like Americans can think of little else. In Europe, Chinese firms arebroadly welcome; in America, they are often viewed with suspicion.
在歐洲，是紅地毯，在美國(guó)，是蒙蒙的紅霧。中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院總理溫家寶在這周的歐洲首都之行上，凸顯了大西洋彼岸的國(guó)家對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力增強(qiáng)的不同反應(yīng)。歐洲各國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，被歐元區(qū)危機(jī)弄得焦頭爛額，迫切希望中國(guó)購(gòu)買(mǎi)他們的債券，美國(guó)的政客則擔(dān)心中國(guó)蠶食他們的利益;對(duì)于歐洲的政客，人民幣的價(jià)值只是他們擔(dān)心的一個(gè)方面，而在美國(guó)卻盯著此不放;在歐洲，中國(guó)的公司受到廣泛的歡迎，在美國(guó)，他們卻經(jīng)常被視作動(dòng)機(jī)不純。
Europes receptiveness to China is born partly of weakness. Delegations from peripheraleuro-zone countries have been flying into Beijing to seek buyers of their debt. Fixers workingfor Chinese companies report a steady stream of inquiries from cash-strapped European firms.But even among Europes stronger economies, the political bias is to promote investment fromChina, not deter it.
歐洲對(duì)中國(guó)的接納部分是因?yàn)闅W洲經(jīng)濟(jì)的疲軟。歐元區(qū)的小國(guó)代表團(tuán)已經(jīng)飛往北京去尋找債券購(gòu)買(mǎi)人了，為中國(guó)公司工作的調(diào)停者已經(jīng)從那些現(xiàn)金流不足的歐洲公司那里整理出一份詳細(xì)的咨詢(xún)報(bào)告。甚至是那些強(qiáng)大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，政治的偏見(jiàn)都沒(méi)能夠抑制從中國(guó)來(lái)的投資。
That stance will have big consequences. Chinasforeign direct investment to date has focused onsecuring the energy and resources that itsindustrialising economy craves. Chinese money hasbeen visible in Asia, Africa and Latin America, buyingup everything from copper mines in Peru andfarmland in Tanzania to aluminium smelters inAustralia. But the next stage in Chinas emergenceis under way and it will centre on Europe.
這種立場(chǎng)將會(huì)產(chǎn)生巨大的影響。中國(guó)至今的對(duì)外直接投資都是集中在牢牢把握能源資源方面，那些可以滿(mǎn)足工業(yè)化經(jīng)濟(jì)的資源。中國(guó)的投資可以在亞洲，非洲，拉丁美洲都可被看到，從秘魯?shù)你~礦，坦桑尼亞的農(nóng)田到澳大利亞的鋁礦熔爐，他們統(tǒng)統(tǒng)全部買(mǎi)下。中國(guó)下一階段的計(jì)劃顯然就是當(dāng)下正在做的并把中心移至歐洲。
To understand why, consider each of the worlds three largest economic powers in turn. Chinawants to climb the development ladder. Its burgeoning domestic markets are fiercelycontested, so its firms want new sources of advantage like Western brands and marketingexpertise. Its export-oriented firms want to lock in closer ties with end-customers.
想知道為什么嗎?以此考慮一下世界三個(gè)大經(jīng)濟(jì)體的力量吧。中國(guó)想要搭上這次發(fā)展的快車(chē)。它自己國(guó)內(nèi)快速發(fā)展的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈，所以中國(guó)的公司想要一些新的優(yōu)勢(shì)資源，比如像歐洲的品牌和市場(chǎng)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，出口導(dǎo)向的公司希望和終端消費(fèi)者靠的更近一些。
America is the natural place for China to turn to but the economic relationship between thesuperpower and the dragon breathing down its neck is fraught. Ever since CNOOC, a state-controlled Chinese oil firm, was forced out of the bidding for Californias Unocal in 2005 bycongressional and media critics, many big Chinese companies have regarded America asfundamentally hostile to their investments.
美國(guó)最自然是中國(guó)企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移的最佳地方，但是這個(gè)超級(jí)大國(guó)和他鼻子下呼吸的中國(guó)龍的經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系并不是那么的令人愉快。自從2005年中海油中國(guó)國(guó)有控制的石油公司被國(guó)會(huì)和媒體批評(píng)家從加州優(yōu)尼科公司的競(jìng)價(jià)中強(qiáng)制哄走后，好多中國(guó)公司都認(rèn)為美國(guó)對(duì)他們投資存在根本敵意。
This perception is not entirely fair. The process for screening inward investments into Americaon security grounds does not appear to discriminate against China. But Chinese companieswanting to buy American assets must be prepared to risk public attacks by wealthy lobbygroups and frothing congressmen. Many choose to avoid America instead. A report by the AsiaSociety in Washington, DC, says that scaremongering about China could lead America to forfeita share of $1 trillion-worth of outward Chinese direct investment by 2023.
這種認(rèn)識(shí)并不是公平的。對(duì)進(jìn)入美國(guó)的對(duì)內(nèi)投資進(jìn)行程序的審查并不能表示是對(duì)中國(guó)的歧視。中國(guó)公司想要購(gòu)買(mǎi)美國(guó)資產(chǎn)必須做好應(yīng)對(duì)來(lái)自富人游說(shuō)團(tuán)體和國(guó)會(huì)議員攻擊的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是很多都選擇避開(kāi)美國(guó)。一份來(lái)自華盛頓的亞洲社會(huì)顯示，到2023年，對(duì)中國(guó)散布的謠言將會(huì)是使美國(guó)喪失一份價(jià)值1萬(wàn)億美元的中國(guó)直接對(duì)外投資。
More of that cash is instead heading to Europe. Investment bankers there are now sure to dialChinese clients if they hear that a firm is a possible bid target. Chinese banks are rapidlyincreasing their presence in Europe. Mainlanders are snapping up central London residences.Chinese direct investment abroad has increased faster in Europe than in any other region.
更甚的是，現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)而都流向了歐洲，現(xiàn)在，投資銀行聽(tīng)到一公司可能會(huì)有競(jìng)標(biāo)的投資目標(biāo)，就一定會(huì)給中國(guó)的客戶(hù)打電話(huà)咨詢(xún)。中國(guó)的銀行在歐洲出現(xiàn)的次數(shù)也快速的增多起來(lái)。中國(guó)人正在搶購(gòu)倫敦市中心的豪宅。中國(guó)在歐洲的直接投資增長(zhǎng)速度超過(guò)了其他任何地方。
The Europeans get more than just money. A Chinesepartner is a good way for a European brand to gainaccess to the worlds soon-to-be-biggest economy.Ask Frances Club Med, which now has a big Chineseshareholder and recently opened its first holidayresort in the country. Or CIFA, an Italianconstruction-equipment maker whose products arenow marketed as a premium brand by its Chineseowner. Or Swedens Volvo, which was bought byGeely, a Chinese carmaker, in 2010 and now callsChina its second home market.
歐洲得到的不僅僅是金錢(qián)。一個(gè)中國(guó)搭檔就是一條可以使歐洲品牌通往世界快速增長(zhǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的捷徑。問(wèn)一下法國(guó)麥德俱樂(lè)部，現(xiàn)在有一個(gè)中國(guó)大股東，最近在中國(guó)建立了他的第一個(gè)度假村。還有CIFA，一家意大利施工設(shè)備制造廠，現(xiàn)在在中國(guó)新東家的管理下，他的產(chǎn)品已經(jīng)成為市場(chǎng)上的頂級(jí)品牌。還有瑞典的沃爾沃，已經(jīng)被一家中國(guó)汽車(chē)制造商吉利在2010購(gòu)買(mǎi)，現(xiàn)在稱(chēng)中國(guó)為第二本土市場(chǎng)。
European voters are less happy about all this than their leaders: polls show that they viewChinese investments nearly as negatively as Americans do. Three worries predominate. Thefirst is that China will strip Europe of technology and jobs. It is true that Chinese firms areoften interested in buying European companies to use their know-how in China . But Chinese firms want to conquer markets abroad as well as at home, and to do thatin Europe, they must create jobs there. The second fear is that the Chinese are buyingEuropean jewels on the cheap. But theres no evidence for that. Indeed, they are more likely tooverpay: countries and firms with excess savings nearly always do. The third concern is thatinvestments in assets like utilities and mobile technology threaten Europes security. Butprocesses exist to screen foreign investments on those grounds. Theres no reason to thinkthat they are wanting, and no reason to tighten them until that changes.
歐洲的選民可不像他們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)那么開(kāi)心：民意調(diào)查顯示他們對(duì)中國(guó)投資看法幾乎和美國(guó)人差不多消極。有三個(gè)明顯的擔(dān)心。第一就是中國(guó)奪走了歐洲的技術(shù)和工作。中國(guó)企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)歐洲公司并利用歐洲的技術(shù)在中國(guó)生產(chǎn)，他們經(jīng)常只對(duì)此感興趣這是真的。但是中國(guó)企業(yè)想要像在國(guó)內(nèi)一樣在歐洲征服海外市場(chǎng)。他們必須在那里創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位。第二個(gè)擔(dān)心就是中國(guó)人低階購(gòu)買(mǎi)歐洲珠寶，但是這還沒(méi)有什么證據(jù)證明。事實(shí)上，他們更喜歡高價(jià)購(gòu)買(mǎi)：那些有著過(guò)多存款國(guó)家和企業(yè)經(jīng)常如此做。第三個(gè)就是對(duì)公用工程和交通技術(shù)的投資會(huì)威脅到歐洲的安全。但是在這方面現(xiàn)有對(duì)國(guó)外投資的審查程序。現(xiàn)在沒(méi)有理由認(rèn)為那就是他們要的，也沒(méi)有理由在那改變之前來(lái)縛束他們。
Chinas outward march certainly argues for vigilance, for it is the consequence of a huge shiftin the balance of power, and change always involves risk. But the opportunities are greater thanthe dangers. In welcoming China, Europe is swimming with the tide of history; America isstruggling against it.
中國(guó)的對(duì)外投資大軍當(dāng)然是謹(jǐn)慎的辯解，因?yàn)檫@對(duì)力量平衡的巨大轉(zhuǎn)移有著重大意義，并且改變經(jīng)常伴隨著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是機(jī)遇是大于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的。在對(duì)中國(guó)的歡迎中，歐洲順應(yīng)了歷史的潮流，而美國(guó)正在極力的反對(duì)這種趨勢(shì)。
China abroad 中國(guó)的海外投資
IN EUROPE, the red carpet. In America, a red mist.This weeks tour of European capitals by Wen Jiabao,Chinas prime minister, underlined the starktransatlantic difference in responses to Chinas economic clout. European leaders, caught up inthe euro areas crisis, want China to buy more of their debt; American politicians worry that itowns too much of theirs. For European politicians the value of the yuan is one worry amongmany; it sometimes feels like Americans can think of little else. In Europe, Chinese firms arebroadly welcome; in America, they are often viewed with suspicion.
在歐洲，是紅地毯，在美國(guó)，是蒙蒙的紅霧。中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院總理溫家寶在這周的歐洲首都之行上，凸顯了大西洋彼岸的國(guó)家對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力增強(qiáng)的不同反應(yīng)。歐洲各國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，被歐元區(qū)危機(jī)弄得焦頭爛額，迫切希望中國(guó)購(gòu)買(mǎi)他們的債券，美國(guó)的政客則擔(dān)心中國(guó)蠶食他們的利益;對(duì)于歐洲的政客，人民幣的價(jià)值只是他們擔(dān)心的一個(gè)方面，而在美國(guó)卻盯著此不放;在歐洲，中國(guó)的公司受到廣泛的歡迎，在美國(guó)，他們卻經(jīng)常被視作動(dòng)機(jī)不純。
Europes receptiveness to China is born partly of weakness. Delegations from peripheraleuro-zone countries have been flying into Beijing to seek buyers of their debt. Fixers workingfor Chinese companies report a steady stream of inquiries from cash-strapped European firms.But even among Europes stronger economies, the political bias is to promote investment fromChina, not deter it.
歐洲對(duì)中國(guó)的接納部分是因?yàn)闅W洲經(jīng)濟(jì)的疲軟。歐元區(qū)的小國(guó)代表團(tuán)已經(jīng)飛往北京去尋找債券購(gòu)買(mǎi)人了，為中國(guó)公司工作的調(diào)停者已經(jīng)從那些現(xiàn)金流不足的歐洲公司那里整理出一份詳細(xì)的咨詢(xún)報(bào)告。甚至是那些強(qiáng)大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，政治的偏見(jiàn)都沒(méi)能夠抑制從中國(guó)來(lái)的投資。
That stance will have big consequences. Chinasforeign direct investment to date has focused onsecuring the energy and resources that itsindustrialising economy craves. Chinese money hasbeen visible in Asia, Africa and Latin America, buyingup everything from copper mines in Peru andfarmland in Tanzania to aluminium smelters inAustralia. But the next stage in Chinas emergenceis under way and it will centre on Europe.
這種立場(chǎng)將會(huì)產(chǎn)生巨大的影響。中國(guó)至今的對(duì)外直接投資都是集中在牢牢把握能源資源方面，那些可以滿(mǎn)足工業(yè)化經(jīng)濟(jì)的資源。中國(guó)的投資可以在亞洲，非洲，拉丁美洲都可被看到，從秘魯?shù)你~礦，坦桑尼亞的農(nóng)田到澳大利亞的鋁礦熔爐，他們統(tǒng)統(tǒng)全部買(mǎi)下。中國(guó)下一階段的計(jì)劃顯然就是當(dāng)下正在做的并把中心移至歐洲。
To understand why, consider each of the worlds three largest economic powers in turn. Chinawants to climb the development ladder. Its burgeoning domestic markets are fiercelycontested, so its firms want new sources of advantage like Western brands and marketingexpertise. Its export-oriented firms want to lock in closer ties with end-customers.
想知道為什么嗎?以此考慮一下世界三個(gè)大經(jīng)濟(jì)體的力量吧。中國(guó)想要搭上這次發(fā)展的快車(chē)。它自己國(guó)內(nèi)快速發(fā)展的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈，所以中國(guó)的公司想要一些新的優(yōu)勢(shì)資源，比如像歐洲的品牌和市場(chǎng)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，出口導(dǎo)向的公司希望和終端消費(fèi)者靠的更近一些。
America is the natural place for China to turn to but the economic relationship between thesuperpower and the dragon breathing down its neck is fraught. Ever since CNOOC, a state-controlled Chinese oil firm, was forced out of the bidding for Californias Unocal in 2005 bycongressional and media critics, many big Chinese companies have regarded America asfundamentally hostile to their investments.
美國(guó)最自然是中國(guó)企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移的最佳地方，但是這個(gè)超級(jí)大國(guó)和他鼻子下呼吸的中國(guó)龍的經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系并不是那么的令人愉快。自從2005年中海油中國(guó)國(guó)有控制的石油公司被國(guó)會(huì)和媒體批評(píng)家從加州優(yōu)尼科公司的競(jìng)價(jià)中強(qiáng)制哄走后，好多中國(guó)公司都認(rèn)為美國(guó)對(duì)他們投資存在根本敵意。
This perception is not entirely fair. The process for screening inward investments into Americaon security grounds does not appear to discriminate against China. But Chinese companieswanting to buy American assets must be prepared to risk public attacks by wealthy lobbygroups and frothing congressmen. Many choose to avoid America instead. A report by the AsiaSociety in Washington, DC, says that scaremongering about China could lead America to forfeita share of $1 trillion-worth of outward Chinese direct investment by 2023.
這種認(rèn)識(shí)并不是公平的。對(duì)進(jìn)入美國(guó)的對(duì)內(nèi)投資進(jìn)行程序的審查并不能表示是對(duì)中國(guó)的歧視。中國(guó)公司想要購(gòu)買(mǎi)美國(guó)資產(chǎn)必須做好應(yīng)對(duì)來(lái)自富人游說(shuō)團(tuán)體和國(guó)會(huì)議員攻擊的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是很多都選擇避開(kāi)美國(guó)。一份來(lái)自華盛頓的亞洲社會(huì)顯示，到2023年，對(duì)中國(guó)散布的謠言將會(huì)是使美國(guó)喪失一份價(jià)值1萬(wàn)億美元的中國(guó)直接對(duì)外投資。
More of that cash is instead heading to Europe. Investment bankers there are now sure to dialChinese clients if they hear that a firm is a possible bid target. Chinese banks are rapidlyincreasing their presence in Europe. Mainlanders are snapping up central London residences.Chinese direct investment abroad has increased faster in Europe than in any other region.
更甚的是，現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)而都流向了歐洲，現(xiàn)在，投資銀行聽(tīng)到一公司可能會(huì)有競(jìng)標(biāo)的投資目標(biāo)，就一定會(huì)給中國(guó)的客戶(hù)打電話(huà)咨詢(xún)。中國(guó)的銀行在歐洲出現(xiàn)的次數(shù)也快速的增多起來(lái)。中國(guó)人正在搶購(gòu)倫敦市中心的豪宅。中國(guó)在歐洲的直接投資增長(zhǎng)速度超過(guò)了其他任何地方。
The Europeans get more than just money. A Chinesepartner is a good way for a European brand to gainaccess to the worlds soon-to-be-biggest economy.Ask Frances Club Med, which now has a big Chineseshareholder and recently opened its first holidayresort in the country. Or CIFA, an Italianconstruction-equipment maker whose products arenow marketed as a premium brand by its Chineseowner. Or Swedens Volvo, which was bought byGeely, a Chinese carmaker, in 2010 and now callsChina its second home market.
歐洲得到的不僅僅是金錢(qián)。一個(gè)中國(guó)搭檔就是一條可以使歐洲品牌通往世界快速增長(zhǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的捷徑。問(wèn)一下法國(guó)麥德俱樂(lè)部，現(xiàn)在有一個(gè)中國(guó)大股東，最近在中國(guó)建立了他的第一個(gè)度假村。還有CIFA，一家意大利施工設(shè)備制造廠，現(xiàn)在在中國(guó)新東家的管理下，他的產(chǎn)品已經(jīng)成為市場(chǎng)上的頂級(jí)品牌。還有瑞典的沃爾沃，已經(jīng)被一家中國(guó)汽車(chē)制造商吉利在2010購(gòu)買(mǎi)，現(xiàn)在稱(chēng)中國(guó)為第二本土市場(chǎng)。
European voters are less happy about all this than their leaders: polls show that they viewChinese investments nearly as negatively as Americans do. Three worries predominate. Thefirst is that China will strip Europe of technology and jobs. It is true that Chinese firms areoften interested in buying European companies to use their know-how in China . But Chinese firms want to conquer markets abroad as well as at home, and to do thatin Europe, they must create jobs there. The second fear is that the Chinese are buyingEuropean jewels on the cheap. But theres no evidence for that. Indeed, they are more likely tooverpay: countries and firms with excess savings nearly always do. The third concern is thatinvestments in assets like utilities and mobile technology threaten Europes security. Butprocesses exist to screen foreign investments on those grounds. Theres no reason to thinkthat they are wanting, and no reason to tighten them until that changes.
歐洲的選民可不像他們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)那么開(kāi)心：民意調(diào)查顯示他們對(duì)中國(guó)投資看法幾乎和美國(guó)人差不多消極。有三個(gè)明顯的擔(dān)心。第一就是中國(guó)奪走了歐洲的技術(shù)和工作。中國(guó)企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)歐洲公司并利用歐洲的技術(shù)在中國(guó)生產(chǎn)，他們經(jīng)常只對(duì)此感興趣這是真的。但是中國(guó)企業(yè)想要像在國(guó)內(nèi)一樣在歐洲征服海外市場(chǎng)。他們必須在那里創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位。第二個(gè)擔(dān)心就是中國(guó)人低階購(gòu)買(mǎi)歐洲珠寶，但是這還沒(méi)有什么證據(jù)證明。事實(shí)上，他們更喜歡高價(jià)購(gòu)買(mǎi)：那些有著過(guò)多存款國(guó)家和企業(yè)經(jīng)常如此做。第三個(gè)就是對(duì)公用工程和交通技術(shù)的投資會(huì)威脅到歐洲的安全。但是在這方面現(xiàn)有對(duì)國(guó)外投資的審查程序。現(xiàn)在沒(méi)有理由認(rèn)為那就是他們要的，也沒(méi)有理由在那改變之前來(lái)縛束他們。
Chinas outward march certainly argues for vigilance, for it is the consequence of a huge shiftin the balance of power, and change always involves risk. But the opportunities are greater thanthe dangers. In welcoming China, Europe is swimming with the tide of history; America isstruggling against it.
中國(guó)的對(duì)外投資大軍當(dāng)然是謹(jǐn)慎的辯解，因?yàn)檫@對(duì)力量平衡的巨大轉(zhuǎn)移有著重大意義，并且改變經(jīng)常伴隨著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是機(jī)遇是大于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的。在對(duì)中國(guó)的歡迎中，歐洲順應(yīng)了歷史的潮流，而美國(guó)正在極力的反對(duì)這種趨勢(shì)。
