2023考研英語閱讀中國的外賣廚房緬甸
Three articles look at Chinas influence in South-EastAsia: first;resentment in Myanmar;second,Cambodian rivalries; third, Banyan on the strategicimplications
三篇文章都關注了中國在東南亞的影響問題：第一篇，緬甸之怨;第二篇，柬埔寨的對抗;第三篇是Banyan專欄關于戰(zhàn)略意義的一篇文章。
WAIST-DEEP in the muddy water, hundreds ofpeople swirl their pans, scouring the blacksediment for the sparkle of golddust. They have come from all over Myanmar to Kachin state,where the NMai andMali rivers merge to form the mighty Irrawaddy, knowing that a good daymayyield $1,000-worth of goldand that time for gold-panning is running out.
在緬甸的克欽邦，恩梅開江和邁立開江交會成為浩蕩的伊洛瓦底江。在齊腰深的渾濁的江水中，可以見到數(shù)百名淘金者晃動淘選盤，在黑色的沉淀物中仔細搜尋閃閃發(fā)光的金粒。這些人是從全國各地來到克欽邦的，他們知道，如果幸運的話，一天的淘金收入可以達到1000美金，但他們也清楚，淘金的時日已然不多。
Across the river, the corrugated-iron roofsof a prefabricated barracks glint in the midday sun.They house hundreds ofChinese labourers working on the Myitsone hydropower project. This,accordingto Myanmarsgovernment, will be the sixth highest dam in the world, and generate6,000MW ofelectricity a year. On completion in 2023, the dam will flood thegold-prospectingarea and displace more than 10,000 people. All the electricitywill be exported to China.All therevenue will go to Myanmarsgovernment. If an environmental and social impact study wasconducted at all,it did not involve consulting the affected villagers.
在江對面，預制棚屋的波形鐵皮屋頂在正午陽光的照耀下閃閃發(fā)光。在那些屋子里寓居著數(shù)百名修建密松水電站的中國勞工。緬甸政府表示，該水電站的大壩高程位列世界第六，每年能夠發(fā)電6000兆瓦。2023年工程竣工后，大壩周邊的金礦勘探地區(qū)將被淹沒，并且還要轉移 1000人到其他地區(qū)。所有的電能將被輸送到中國，而所有的收入將統(tǒng)統(tǒng)流入緬甸政府的錢袋。即使他們真地做了環(huán)境和社會影響研究的話，但那也并未涉及征詢受影響村民意見的環(huán)節(jié)。
A local Catholic priest who led prayersagainst the dam says his parishioners were moved to amodel village, intotiny houses on plots too small for cultivation. The letters of concern hesentto Myanmarsleaders went unanswered. He says he will stay in his historic church tillthewaters rise over the doorstep.
當?shù)氐囊粋€天主教神父曾組織過禱告活動，以抗議修建大壩，他表示他的教區(qū)居民被遷移到一個模范村，那里的房子非常小，而且房子周圍的土地也很少，根本不適合耕種。他寄給緬甸領導人反映問題的信件，至今仍然未予回復。他表示他將呆在的那座歷史上著名的教堂中，直到江水沒過門階。
Those displaced are not the only onesworryingabout the project. The project abuts territorycontrolled by theKachin Independence Organisation, one of a plethora of ethnicinsurgencies thathave battled the central government for decades.Last yearseveral bombs exploded at the dam siteand in May the KIO warned that if thedam were notstopped it would lead to civil war. The KIOs armedwing recentlyengaged in skirmishes with governmentforces, despite a notional ceasefire.
那些移民并非只是對該工程表示擔憂的唯一群體。該工程的毗鄰地區(qū)處在克欽獨立組織的控制之下，而在過去幾十年中，眾多部落叛軍團體紛紛與中央政府為敵，這個組織只是其中的一員。去年，數(shù)枚炸彈在壩址引爆，五月份克欽獨立組織又警告說，如果大壩不停工，將引發(fā)內戰(zhàn)。盡管在名義上已經達成停火，但克欽獨立組織的武裝派別近來多次與政府軍發(fā)生小規(guī)模沖突。
The KIO was banned from last yearselection in Myanmarbecause it refused to let its fightersjoin the governments border securityforce. Its threat came as Myanmarsnewly installedcivilian president, Thein Sein, a former general, embarked ona state visit to China.
克欽獨立組織被禁止參加去年的緬甸大選，因為它拒絕讓自己的士兵加入政府組建的邊防安全部隊。當緬甸新近當選的平民總統(tǒng)登盛開始訪問中國時，克欽獨立組織就蠢蠢欲動了。
China has a big stake in Myanmar.It is the countrys leading foreign investor. Myitsone is oneof manyhydropower, mining and infrastructure projects there. Chinas mostambitiousundertaking is a new deep-sea port for oil tankers. Due forcompletion in 2023, it will take gasfrom Myanmarsoffshore Shwe field and will have the capacity to satisfy 10% of Chinasoil-import needs.
中國在緬甸擁有重大利益，是該國重要的外國投資者。密松水電站是中國在那里修建的眾多水電站、礦產和基礎設施工程之一。其中，中國所承攬的最為雄心勃勃的工程是一個深海油輪碼頭，它將在2023年竣工，屆時它將負責轉運緬甸近海丹瑞氣田的天然氣，而且將能夠滿足10%的中國石油進口需求。
These close ties are not entirelycomfortable for either side. Between 1mand 2m Chinese citizenshave movedinto northern Myanmar.They dominate the jade-and-gem trade, push up landprices and flaunt theirwealth in Mandalayand Myitkyina, where all the posh cars have Chinesenumber plates. Localresentment is growing. Church leaders in Myitkyina say Chinese peoplemake upmore than half the population. Many Burmese say their northern states are likeaChinese province.
這些緊密聯(lián)系沒有讓雙方完全滿意。有一百萬到二百萬中國人已經遷移到了緬甸北部。在曼德勒和密支那，他們壟斷了玉石貿易，推高了土地價格，還經常炫耀自己的財富。在這兩個城市，所有的豪華車都掛著中國的車牌。當?shù)厝说脑箽庾兊迷絹碓酱蟆Ｃ苤堑淖诮填I袖表示，中國人占當?shù)厝丝诘亩嘁话搿ＴS多緬甸人都說，他們的北部各邦儼然就是中國的一個省份。
China,for its part, worries about the security of its investments and people. In thepast it hasleaned on Myanmarsleaders to prevent fighting between the army and the ethnic insurgencies.Whenconflict broke out in 2009 with the Kokang, an ethnic-Han-Chinese minority,37,000people fled to China,provoking sharp criticism of the Burmese junta.
中國方面則擔心其投資和人員的安全。在過去，中國一直依賴緬甸領導人來阻止軍隊和部落叛軍之間的沖突。在2009年，當少數(shù)族裔漢族與果敢爆發(fā)沖突時，37000人逃往中國，緬甸軍政府受到強烈批評。
As its economic interests have grown, China has pressed for more access to Myanmarsharbours and territorial waters, to monitor the security of the new port andpipelines, and to keep an eye out for pirates. But this is a neuralgic issuefor a country with a deep-seated suspicion of its powerful northern neighbour.
隨著經濟利益不斷增長，中國也迫切要求從緬甸獲得更多的港口和領海的使用權，以監(jiān)控新碼頭和管線的安全，并密切注視海盜的行蹤。但是對于一個對其強大的北部鄰國擁有根深蒂固的疑慮的國家來說，這無疑是一個令人大傷腦筋的問題。
Myanmars xenophobic leaders are trying to reduce their dependence on China by playing it off against Indiaand the West. But India hasbeen slow in trying to gain a toehold, while Americaand the European Union have recently extended sanctions on Myanmar. Theseinclude Americasembargo on backing loans from the World Bank, which would impose higherenvironmental and other standards on big infrastructure projects such asMyitsone.
緬甸仇外的領導人試圖在中國與印度和西方國家之間挑撥離間，以減少對中國的依賴。但是印度在設法獲得立腳點方面動作遲緩，而美國和歐盟卻在近來延長了對緬甸的制裁期限。制裁措施中包括美國限制緬甸從世行獲得支持貸款的禁令，這將令大型基建工程如密松水壩不得不接受更為苛刻的環(huán)境和其他標準。
So the regime is being drawn into Chinasorbit as much from necessity as choice. That does not make China any morepopular. In the words of an old Burmese monk: We are Chinaskitchen. They take what they like and leave us with the rubbish.
所以緬甸被納入中國的轂中，這既出于形勢發(fā)展需要，又是自己審慎的選擇。而中國并未因此而受到多少歡迎，用一個緬甸的老和尚的話說就是：我們是中國的廚房，他們任取所需，而留給我們的只有垃圾。
Three articles look at Chinas influence in South-EastAsia: first;resentment in Myanmar;second,Cambodian rivalries; third, Banyan on the strategicimplications
三篇文章都關注了中國在東南亞的影響問題：第一篇，緬甸之怨;第二篇，柬埔寨的對抗;第三篇是Banyan專欄關于戰(zhàn)略意義的一篇文章。
WAIST-DEEP in the muddy water, hundreds ofpeople swirl their pans, scouring the blacksediment for the sparkle of golddust. They have come from all over Myanmar to Kachin state,where the NMai andMali rivers merge to form the mighty Irrawaddy, knowing that a good daymayyield $1,000-worth of goldand that time for gold-panning is running out.
在緬甸的克欽邦，恩梅開江和邁立開江交會成為浩蕩的伊洛瓦底江。在齊腰深的渾濁的江水中，可以見到數(shù)百名淘金者晃動淘選盤，在黑色的沉淀物中仔細搜尋閃閃發(fā)光的金粒。這些人是從全國各地來到克欽邦的，他們知道，如果幸運的話，一天的淘金收入可以達到1000美金，但他們也清楚，淘金的時日已然不多。
Across the river, the corrugated-iron roofsof a prefabricated barracks glint in the midday sun.They house hundreds ofChinese labourers working on the Myitsone hydropower project. This,accordingto Myanmarsgovernment, will be the sixth highest dam in the world, and generate6,000MW ofelectricity a year. On completion in 2023, the dam will flood thegold-prospectingarea and displace more than 10,000 people. All the electricitywill be exported to China.All therevenue will go to Myanmarsgovernment. If an environmental and social impact study wasconducted at all,it did not involve consulting the affected villagers.
在江對面，預制棚屋的波形鐵皮屋頂在正午陽光的照耀下閃閃發(fā)光。在那些屋子里寓居著數(shù)百名修建密松水電站的中國勞工。緬甸政府表示，該水電站的大壩高程位列世界第六，每年能夠發(fā)電6000兆瓦。2023年工程竣工后，大壩周邊的金礦勘探地區(qū)將被淹沒，并且還要轉移 1000人到其他地區(qū)。所有的電能將被輸送到中國，而所有的收入將統(tǒng)統(tǒng)流入緬甸政府的錢袋。即使他們真地做了環(huán)境和社會影響研究的話，但那也并未涉及征詢受影響村民意見的環(huán)節(jié)。
A local Catholic priest who led prayersagainst the dam says his parishioners were moved to amodel village, intotiny houses on plots too small for cultivation. The letters of concern hesentto Myanmarsleaders went unanswered. He says he will stay in his historic church tillthewaters rise over the doorstep.
當?shù)氐囊粋€天主教神父曾組織過禱告活動，以抗議修建大壩，他表示他的教區(qū)居民被遷移到一個模范村，那里的房子非常小，而且房子周圍的土地也很少，根本不適合耕種。他寄給緬甸領導人反映問題的信件，至今仍然未予回復。他表示他將呆在的那座歷史上著名的教堂中，直到江水沒過門階。
Those displaced are not the only onesworryingabout the project. The project abuts territorycontrolled by theKachin Independence Organisation, one of a plethora of ethnicinsurgencies thathave battled the central government for decades.Last yearseveral bombs exploded at the dam siteand in May the KIO warned that if thedam were notstopped it would lead to civil war. The KIOs armedwing recentlyengaged in skirmishes with governmentforces, despite a notional ceasefire.
那些移民并非只是對該工程表示擔憂的唯一群體。該工程的毗鄰地區(qū)處在克欽獨立組織的控制之下，而在過去幾十年中，眾多部落叛軍團體紛紛與中央政府為敵，這個組織只是其中的一員。去年，數(shù)枚炸彈在壩址引爆，五月份克欽獨立組織又警告說，如果大壩不停工，將引發(fā)內戰(zhàn)。盡管在名義上已經達成停火，但克欽獨立組織的武裝派別近來多次與政府軍發(fā)生小規(guī)模沖突。
The KIO was banned from last yearselection in Myanmarbecause it refused to let its fightersjoin the governments border securityforce. Its threat came as Myanmarsnewly installedcivilian president, Thein Sein, a former general, embarked ona state visit to China.
克欽獨立組織被禁止參加去年的緬甸大選，因為它拒絕讓自己的士兵加入政府組建的邊防安全部隊。當緬甸新近當選的平民總統(tǒng)登盛開始訪問中國時，克欽獨立組織就蠢蠢欲動了。
China has a big stake in Myanmar.It is the countrys leading foreign investor. Myitsone is oneof manyhydropower, mining and infrastructure projects there. Chinas mostambitiousundertaking is a new deep-sea port for oil tankers. Due forcompletion in 2023, it will take gasfrom Myanmarsoffshore Shwe field and will have the capacity to satisfy 10% of Chinasoil-import needs.
中國在緬甸擁有重大利益，是該國重要的外國投資者。密松水電站是中國在那里修建的眾多水電站、礦產和基礎設施工程之一。其中，中國所承攬的最為雄心勃勃的工程是一個深海油輪碼頭，它將在2023年竣工，屆時它將負責轉運緬甸近海丹瑞氣田的天然氣，而且將能夠滿足10%的中國石油進口需求。
These close ties are not entirelycomfortable for either side. Between 1mand 2m Chinese citizenshave movedinto northern Myanmar.They dominate the jade-and-gem trade, push up landprices and flaunt theirwealth in Mandalayand Myitkyina, where all the posh cars have Chinesenumber plates. Localresentment is growing. Church leaders in Myitkyina say Chinese peoplemake upmore than half the population. Many Burmese say their northern states are likeaChinese province.
這些緊密聯(lián)系沒有讓雙方完全滿意。有一百萬到二百萬中國人已經遷移到了緬甸北部。在曼德勒和密支那，他們壟斷了玉石貿易，推高了土地價格，還經常炫耀自己的財富。在這兩個城市，所有的豪華車都掛著中國的車牌。當?shù)厝说脑箽庾兊迷絹碓酱蟆Ｃ苤堑淖诮填I袖表示，中國人占當?shù)厝丝诘亩嘁话搿ＴS多緬甸人都說，他們的北部各邦儼然就是中國的一個省份。
China,for its part, worries about the security of its investments and people. In thepast it hasleaned on Myanmarsleaders to prevent fighting between the army and the ethnic insurgencies.Whenconflict broke out in 2009 with the Kokang, an ethnic-Han-Chinese minority,37,000people fled to China,provoking sharp criticism of the Burmese junta.
中國方面則擔心其投資和人員的安全。在過去，中國一直依賴緬甸領導人來阻止軍隊和部落叛軍之間的沖突。在2009年，當少數(shù)族裔漢族與果敢爆發(fā)沖突時，37000人逃往中國，緬甸軍政府受到強烈批評。
As its economic interests have grown, China has pressed for more access to Myanmarsharbours and territorial waters, to monitor the security of the new port andpipelines, and to keep an eye out for pirates. But this is a neuralgic issuefor a country with a deep-seated suspicion of its powerful northern neighbour.
隨著經濟利益不斷增長，中國也迫切要求從緬甸獲得更多的港口和領海的使用權，以監(jiān)控新碼頭和管線的安全，并密切注視海盜的行蹤。但是對于一個對其強大的北部鄰國擁有根深蒂固的疑慮的國家來說，這無疑是一個令人大傷腦筋的問題。
Myanmars xenophobic leaders are trying to reduce their dependence on China by playing it off against Indiaand the West. But India hasbeen slow in trying to gain a toehold, while Americaand the European Union have recently extended sanctions on Myanmar. Theseinclude Americasembargo on backing loans from the World Bank, which would impose higherenvironmental and other standards on big infrastructure projects such asMyitsone.
緬甸仇外的領導人試圖在中國與印度和西方國家之間挑撥離間，以減少對中國的依賴。但是印度在設法獲得立腳點方面動作遲緩，而美國和歐盟卻在近來延長了對緬甸的制裁期限。制裁措施中包括美國限制緬甸從世行獲得支持貸款的禁令，這將令大型基建工程如密松水壩不得不接受更為苛刻的環(huán)境和其他標準。
So the regime is being drawn into Chinasorbit as much from necessity as choice. That does not make China any morepopular. In the words of an old Burmese monk: We are Chinaskitchen. They take what they like and leave us with the rubbish.
所以緬甸被納入中國的轂中，這既出于形勢發(fā)展需要，又是自己審慎的選擇。而中國并未因此而受到多少歡迎，用一個緬甸的老和尚的話說就是：我們是中國的廚房，他們任取所需，而留給我們的只有垃圾。
