朝鮮與俄羅斯 孤立中的牽手

For diplomat Im Cheon Il, there has never been a better time to invite Russian children to spend their holidays at a North Korean youth camp.對朝鮮駐俄羅斯東部使節(jié)Im Cheon Il來說，沒有比眼下更適合邀請俄羅斯孩子到朝鮮青少年夏令營度假的時(shí)機(jī)了。“The political relationship between our countries is developing more productively than ever before,” said Mr Im, an envoy based in eastern Russia, after making the proposal this week to officials from the northeastern territory of Yakutia, which published the remarks on its website.這名外交官說：“我們兩國間政治關(guān)系的發(fā)展比以往任何時(shí)候都更有成效。”本周，他向來自俄東北部雅庫特(Yakutia)的官員提出了上述建議，雅庫特政府則在其網(wǎng)站上發(fā)布了上述談話。

He is one of many to have observed a marked deepening of ties between the countries, as shared diplomatic and economic problems push them into each other’s arms.還有很多人像Im Cheon Il一樣注意到了朝俄關(guān)系的明顯深化。外交和經(jīng)濟(jì)問題正促使這兩個國家投入彼此的懷抱。Russia has stepped up economic co-operation with North Korea as part of its “Look East” policy, which has been lent urgency by its growing diplomatic and economic isolation from the west. A beneficiary of Soviet largesse during the cold war, North Korea has enthusiastically welcomed Moscow’s attentions, designating 2024 a year of friendship with Russia as it seeks to attract direly needed investment and ease an overwhelming economic reliance on Beijing.作為“向東看”政策的一部分，俄羅斯加大了與朝鮮的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作。俄羅斯在外交和經(jīng)濟(jì)上日益受到西方孤立，給這項(xiàng)政策增添了緊迫感。作為冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期蘇聯(lián)慷慨援助的受益者，朝鮮對俄羅斯給予它的關(guān)注表示了熱烈歡迎，并將2024年定為朝俄友好年。朝鮮希望從俄羅斯吸引它亟需的投資，并在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面減輕對中國的過度依賴。A symbolic crowning of this trend looks set to come next month, when Kim Jong Un is expected to make his first foreign trip as North Korea’s leader to attend a Moscow parade that will mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war.標(biāo)志著這一趨勢發(fā)展到高潮的事件似乎將在下月出現(xiàn)。屆時(shí)，金正恩(Kim Jong Un)有望作為朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人首次出訪外國，出席莫斯科為紀(jì)念二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束70周年舉行的閱兵式。In March Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, said the North Korean leader had accepted the invitation to the parade, although sceptical officials in Seoul have pointed out that the word “l(fā)eader” might apply to Kim Yong Nam, the nominal head of state, and North Korea’s official media have been silent on the subject.今年3月，俄外長謝爾蓋拉夫羅夫(Sergei Lavrov)表示，朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已接受出席閱兵式的邀請，盡管持懷疑態(tài)度的韓國官員指出，這位朝鮮“領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人”可能指的是朝鮮名義上的國家元首金永南(Kim Yong Nam)。朝鮮官方媒體則在這件事上一直保持沉默。Yet Mr Kim’s visit would be just the latest stage in a flurry of high-level contact between the two nations this year.不過，如金正恩訪俄，將只標(biāo)志著兩國之間一年來一連串高層接觸發(fā)展到最新階段。In April last year Yuri Trutnev, Russia’s deputy prime minister, went to Pyongyang in the first visit at that level since the fall of the Soviet Union. North Korea reciprocated in the autumn by sending Ri Su Yong, the foreign minister, and Choe Ryong Hae, a top aide to Kim Jong Un, to Russia for two unusually long trips totalling 18 days.去年4月，俄副總理尤里特魯特涅夫(Yuri Trutnev)訪問平壤，這是蘇聯(lián)解體以來俄副總理級別官員首次訪朝。去年8月，朝鮮投桃報(bào)李分別派遣外相李洙墉(Ri Su-yong)和金正恩最高助手崔龍海(Choe Ryong-hae)訪俄，這兩次出訪時(shí)間都特別長，總計(jì)18天。These meetings have yielded tangible results, notes Alexey Maslov at Moscow’s National Research University, contrasting it with the previous pattern of “political decoration without economic content”.俄羅斯國立研究大學(xué)(National Research University)的阿列克謝馬斯洛夫(Alexey Maslov)指出，這些會晤取得了實(shí)質(zhì)性成果，與此前那種“沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)內(nèi)容的政治裝點(diǎn)”形成鮮明對照。The most important agreement was sealed in October, when Russia agreed to refurbish 3,500km of North Korean rail track in exchange for access to coal and other minerals.去年10月，兩國敲定了一項(xiàng)極其重要的協(xié)議：俄同意改造朝鮮3500公里長的鐵路，以換取對朝方煤炭和其他礦產(chǎn)資源的開采權(quán)。Pyongyang’s decision to open its abundant mineral resources to Russia follows signs of frustration at its dependence on China for demand and investment in this area.平壤方面決定向俄開放其豐富的礦產(chǎn)資源前，有跡象顯示，朝鮮依靠中國解決礦產(chǎn)需求和投資的努力遭遇了挫折。Jang Song Thaek, Mr Kim’s uncle and top adviser who had led economic engagement with China, was accused of “selling off precious resources of the country at cheap prices” before his execution for treason in December 2024. North Korea has received significantly lower rates of payment than other exporters for its shipments to China of minerals such as zinc and lead, according to Kevin Stahler at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.金正恩的姑父兼最高顧問、曾領(lǐng)導(dǎo)朝中經(jīng)濟(jì)合作的張成澤(Jang Song Thaek)被控“廉價(jià)變賣國家寶貴資源”，并在2024年12月被以叛國罪處決。彼得森國際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的凱文斯塔勒(Kevin Stahler)表示，朝鮮出口到中國的鋅、鉛等礦產(chǎn)的價(jià)格顯著低于其他出口國。The track upgrade would follow Russia’s completion in September 2024 of a rail link connecting its eastern city of Kazan with Rason, a North Korean special economic zone where Russia has sole use of one of the port’s three piers.在上述鐵路線路改造之前，俄羅斯還于2024年9月建成了一條連接俄東部城市喀山(Kazan)與朝鮮羅先經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)(Rason special economic zone)的鐵路。羅先港有三個碼頭，其中一個專供俄羅斯使用。“North Korea is the gateway to South Korea and other Asian markets,” says Georgy Toloraya, head of Korean programmes at the Russian Academy of Sciences. “The railroad takes us to the Pacific coal market; if things go to plan, we might get shipments of South Korean and Japanese containers, which could revive the trans-Siberian railway.”“朝鮮是（俄）通往韓國及其他亞洲市場的大門，”俄羅斯科學(xué)院(Russian Academy of Science)朝鮮半島項(xiàng)目主管格奧爾基托洛拉亞(Georgy Toloraya)說。“這條鐵路將把我們帶到太平洋地區(qū)的煤炭市場；如果一切按計(jì)劃進(jìn)行，我們可能會裝載發(fā)自韓國和日本的集裝箱貨物，那將讓西伯利亞大鐵路(Trans-Siberian Railway)重?zé)ㄉ鷻C(jī)。”Russia has sought where possible to include both Koreas in its projects on the peninsula, in a long-term bet on their rapprochement and perhaps unification.俄羅斯已在設(shè)法盡量將朝韓同時(shí)納入其朝鮮半島輻射力中——這是一項(xiàng)長期押注，賭的是朝韓兩國未來將實(shí)現(xiàn)和解、也許還會實(shí)現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一。In November a pilot shipment of coal was transported from Russia to South Korea via Rason in what is hoped to become a full-scale trading link, while Vladimir Putin, the Russian leader, discussed the potential for a gas pipeline running the length of the Korean peninsula during a visit to Seoul in 2024.去年11月，一批煤炭被嘗試性地從俄羅斯經(jīng)由羅先運(yùn)至韓國——人們期望這一試點(diǎn)會發(fā)展為一種全面的貿(mào)易聯(lián)系。2024年訪韓期間，俄總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾普京(Vladimir Putin)與韓方探討了建設(shè)一條縱貫朝鮮半島的天然氣管道的可能性。The deepening relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang has drawn scepticism in Seoul, however. In a speech last month Hwang Joon-kook, South Korea’s special envoy for security on the peninsula, suggested that Pyongyang could try to use Russia as “l(fā)everage” in its relationship with China.然而，俄朝關(guān)系的不斷深化已引起首爾方面的懷疑。韓國朝鮮半島事務(wù)特別代表黃浚局(Hwang Joon-kook)在上月一次講話中暗示，平壤方面可能企圖將俄羅斯用作撬動朝中關(guān)系的“杠桿”。This would echo the strategy pursued by North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il Sung, who sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet split to extract assistance from both sides.這種做法呼應(yīng)了朝鮮建國領(lǐng)袖金日成(Kim Il Sung)采取的策略，后者曾設(shè)法利用中蘇之間的分歧從兩方都贏取了援助。But “Russia is not in a position to expand economic co-operation with North Korea”, Mr Hwang argued, pointing to the impact on Moscow of sanctions and low oil prices, as well as its reluctance to jeopardise relations with China.但黃浚局表示，考慮到國際社會對俄制裁和低油價(jià)對俄羅斯造成的沖擊、以及莫斯科方面不愿破壞俄中關(guān)系，“俄羅斯沒有條件擴(kuò)大與朝鮮的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作”。